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SUBSIDIARY STRATEGY OF EMERGING MARKET MULTINATIONALS: 
A HOME COUNTRY INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE  
 
Abstract 
We examine the effects of home country institutional factors, namely, home 
country government support, domestic institutional weaknesses, and state ownership 
on the subsidiary-level strategy of global integration (I) and local responsiveness (R) 
of emerging market multinational enterprises (EMNEs). We draw upon the home 
country institution-based view and the I/R framework to develop our theoretical 
model. We empirically test our hypotheses using an original new survey data 
collected from Chinese multinational subsidiary managers supplemented with parent-
level and country-level data. We find that home country government support and 
domestic institutional weaknesses have significant and negative effects on global 
integration strategy of Chinese multinational subsidiaries. On the other hand, 
domestic institutional weaknesses push foreign subsidiaries to pursue local 
responsiveness strategy. Nevertheless, those with greater degree of state ownership in 
their parent firms are neither willing to disintegrate from their parent firms nor 
motivated to pursue local responsiveness strategy in order to deal with home country 
institutional deficiencies and develop new sources of competitiveness in foreign 
markets. Our findings have advanced the literature on subsidiary strategy in the 
context of EMNEs, and provide important implications for subsidiary managers and 
policy makers. 
 
Key words: subsidiary strategy; global integration; local responsiveness; Chinese 
multinational subsidiaries. 
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SUBSIDIARY STRATEGY OF EMERGING MARKET MULTINATIONALS: 
A HOME COUNTRY INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE 
 
1. Introduction 
The majority of previous studies on emerging market multinational enterprises 
(EMNEs) focus on parent-centric decisions in outward foreign direct investment 
(OFDI), such as choices of establishment modes, ownership structure, and host 
country locations (e.g., Cui & Jiang, 2012; Hong, Wang, & Kafouros, 2015; Lu, Liu, 
Wright, & Filatotchev, 2014; Meyer, Ding, Li, & Zhang, 2014). Yet, little is known 
about EMNEs’ subsidiary strategies, which reflect a notable research gap. We aim to 
address this limitation in our study. 
Subsidiary strategy suggests some level of choice or self-determination on the 
part of the subsidiary (Birkinshaw & Hood, 1998; Birkinshaw & Pedersen, 2009). The 
underlying premise of subsidiary strategy is that decisions are made by subsidiary 
managers in their marketplace, not by headquarters (HQs) managers (Garcia-Pont, 
Canales, & Noboa, 2009; Rugman & Verbeke, 2001; Rugman, Verbeke, & Nguyen, 
2011).  
Birkinshaw & Pedersen (2009) argue that a distinction needs to be made 
between the concepts of subsidiary role and subsidiary strategy. A subsidiary role is 
assigned to it by the parent firm, and the subsidiary is simply to follow orders. 
Subsidiary strategy involves the decision-making power and entrepreneurship of the 
subsidiary in its value-adding activities independently from the parent firm and other 
subsidiaries (Garcia-Pont et al., 2009; Nguyen & Rugman, 2015a, 2015b).  
Much of our knowledge on subsidiary strategy comes from research in the 
context of advanced economy MNEs (Birkinshaw, 1995, 1996; Birkinshaw & 
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Morrison, 1995; Mauri & Phatak, 2001; Nguyen & Rugman, 2015a, 2015b). The 
literature documents the diversity of subsidiaries driven by their specific strategic 
roles, the importance of external embeddedness in host country environments, and 
internal embeddedness within MNEs (Andersson, Forsgren, & Holm, 2002; Hoenen 
& Kostova, 2014; Meyer, Mudambi, & Narula, 2011). Furthermore, highly-developed 
institutions allow MNEs from advanced economies to build and accumulate firm-
specific advantages (FSAs), especially managerial skills, integration systems of 
organizing, and coordinating and orchestrating activities of a spatially dispersed 
network of foreign subsidiaries (Kostova & Roth 2002; Wang, Luo, Lu, Sun, & 
Maksimov, 2014). 
In contrast, EMNEs are latecomers in the world stage, originating from 
complex and weak domestic institutional environments (Luo & Tung, 2007; Luo, 
Xue, & Han, 2010; Pan, Teng, Supapol, Lu, Huang, & Wang, 2014). Home country 
institutions are a source of advantages and disadvantages for EMNEs (Rugman, 
Nguyen, & Wei, 2014). On the one hand, home country government support and state 
ownership provide EMNEs with necessary resources to embark on 
internationalization (Lu et al., 2014; Wang, Hong, & Kafouros, & Wright, 2012). On 
the other hand, domestic institutional weaknesses create disadvantages for EMNEs’ 
foreign subsidiaries due to the liabilities of origin, which emerge as a direct 
consequence of the national origins of EMNEs (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 2000; 
Ramachandra & Pant, 2010).  
The liabilities of origin can affect EMNEs and their foreign subsidiaries 
through a variety of processes, such as organizational imprinting and identity, image, 
capability development and resource scarcity (Ramachandra & Pant, 2010). Because 
EMNEs’ foreign subsidiaries are associated with the weak institutional heritage in 
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home countries, their corporate images and legitimacy in host countries are 
unfavorable (Luo & Tung, 2007; Madhok & Keyhani, 2012; Wang et al., 2014). 
Furthermore, weak domestic institutions have impeded EMNEs to develop traditional 
Western-type FSAs in technology, global brands, and managerial expertise (Hennart, 
2012; Rugman, 2010; Wei, 2010). These create additional costs and challenges of 
doing business abroad for EMENs’ foreign subsidiaries. 
In this study, we argue that subsidiary strategies play an important role for 
EMNEs, in which home country institutions are critical factors influencing the 
strategic behaviors of EMNEs’ foreign subsidiaries. We elaborate on the home 
country institution-based view and the global integration and local responsiveness 
(I/R) framework in developing our conceptual model and hypotheses. The central idea 
of the I/R framework is that on the one hand, the MNE exploits the benefits of 
economies of scale and scope across national borders and must balance the need to be 
responsive to preferences and tastes of local consumers and governments’ regulations 
on the other hand (Bartlett & Ghosbal, 1989; Prahalad & Doz, 1987).  This strategy is 
called “transnational solution” by Bartlett & Ghoshal (1989). 
Our study addresses a key research question “to what extent do home country 
institutions (i.e. home country government support, domestic institutional 
weaknesses, and state ownership) affect the IR strategies of EMNEs’ subsidiaries 
after they enter foreign markets?” We deem that the foreign subsidiaries of Chinese 
MNEs are a particularly interesting research context. The surge of Chinese OFDI has 
been largely attributed to China’s “go global” policy and home country government’s 
direct involvement in the allocation of firms’ resources, which in turn affect their 
internationalization behavior (Buckley, Clegg, Cross, Liu, Voss, & Zheng, 2007; Luo 
et al., 2010; Wang et al., 2012).  
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Furthermore, institutional variations in China affect subsidiary strategies of 
Chinese MNEs through various mechanisms. These include the characteristics of 
parent firms, such as the degree of state ownership, and government affiliation and 
political connections (Cui & Jiang, 2012; Duanmu, 2014; Liang, Ren, & Sun, 2015; 
Pan et al., 2014; Wang et al., 2012); regional locations in China (Hong et al., 2015); 
the nature of FDI projects, such as the level of compliance with government FDI 
policies (Lu et al., 2014; Hong et al., 2015), and the home-host political relations 
(Chen & Young, 2010; Duanmu, 2014).  
We make three new contributions to the literature. First, we advance the extant 
literature on EMNEs with a specific focus on EMNEs’ subsidiary strategies. We 
obtain subsidiary managers’ insights through a survey with Chinese multinational 
subsidiaries for our empirical tests. We also supplement our primary survey data with 
secondary data from multiple sources, including parent-level data from company 
annual reports, and country-level data from public sources. Thus, our theoretical and 
empirical approach differs from Wang et al., (2014) which examines parent-centric 
decision-makings and autonomy delegation to foreign subsidiaries as an enabling 
mechanism for EMNEs; however, they use data from a survey with HQs executives 
of Chinese parent firms.  
Second, our work advances the literature of subsidiary strategies because 
many of the previous studies only focus on how multinational subsidiaries adapt to 
host country institutional environments (Kostova & Roth 2002; Luo, 2001, 2003). 
Given that EMNEs originate from unique and complex institutional environments, we 
explicitly delineate their foreign subsidiaries’ strategies as responses to home country 
government support, domestic institutional weaknesses, and state ownership. 
Furthermore, our analysis on the influence of state ownership on subsidiary strategies 
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is a new and interesting contribution, because this phenomenon has been largely 
neglected in the existing literature. Our study provides insights into the role of state 
ownership in enforcing EMNEs’ competitiveness or aggravating their disadvantages 
in international markets.  
Third, we extend the I/R framework by analyzing it in the context of EMNEs’ 
subsidiaries. While the I/R framework emphasizes the dual achievement of global 
integration and local adaptation for advanced economy MNEs, it might be 
challenging for EMNEs due to their lack of managerial skills in coordinating and 
managing a geographically dispersed network of foreign subsidiaries (Fan, Nyland, & 
Zhu, 2008; Morck, Yeung, & Zhao, 2008; Rugman & Li, 2007). Our study is among 
the first few attempts which investigate how EMNEs’ subsidiaries balance integration 
and responsiveness as responses to domestic institutional advantages and 
disadvantages. Accordingly, we broaden the theoretical knowledge of the I/R 
framework by examining its implications on EMNEs.  
 
2. Theoretical background  
2.1. Subsidiary strategy of global integration and local responsiveness  
Global integration is driven by economies of scale and scope, cost reduction, 
and resource intensity, in which MNEs standardize their production and distribution 
of homogenous products and services on a worldwide basis. In contrast, local 
responsiveness is the ability of MNEs to understand local market variations in 
consumer tastes, and demands in segmented markets, and to respond to different 
national standards and regulations imposed by autonomous governments and agencies 
(Bartlett & Ghosbal, 1989; Prahalad & Doz, 1987).  
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On the one hand, subsidiaries pursue global integration strategy by relying on 
parent-firm FSAs developed in home countries, which are internationally transferred 
at low cost and without substantial adaptation in host countries (Rugman & Verbeke, 
1992, 2001; Rugman, 2002; Rugman & Verbeke, 2008). Global integration is 
consistent with the view that parent firms’ FSAs are critical resources in overcoming 
the liabilities of foreignness, i.e. additional costs and risks of doing business abroad 
(Rugman, 2002; Rugman & Verbeke, 2008).  
On the other hand, subsidiary strategy literature emphasizes that FSAs can be 
developed by both parent firms and by foreign subsidiaries (Nguyen & Rugman, 
2015a, 2015b; Rugman & Verbeke, 2001; Rugman et al., 2011). Subsidiary initiatives 
defined as discrete and proactive undertaking of the subsidiary advances are new 
ways for the MNE to use or expand its resources (Birkinshaw, 1996, 1997; 
Birkinshaw & Hood, 1998). Foreign subsidiaries access complementary resources in 
host countries and create new knowledge, and develop new learning and innovative 
capabilities, which enable them to reap the benefits of local responsiveness as their 
local embeddedness increases (Cantwell & Mudambi, 2005; Nguyen & Rugman, 
2015a, 2015b).  
It will be interesting to examine this phenomenon in the context of EMNEs 
because they lack the traditional knowledge-based FSAs which can be exploited 
abroad (Peng, 2012; Ramamurti, 2009, 2012; Wang et al., 2014). In other words, 
compared with MNEs from advanced economies, subsidiaries of EMNEs rely less on 
their parent firms’ FSAs. Therefore, foreign subsidiaries play critically important 
roles in generating new strategic assets, in establishing local legitimacy and 
reputation, and in catching up with global competitors.  
 
 9 
2.2. Home country institutions and subsidiary strategy   
Home country institutions create advantages and disadvantages for EMNEs 
and their foreign subsidiaries. First, resources and capabilities of EMNEs are based on 
home country-specific advantages (CSAs) (Buckley et al., 2007; Rugman & Nguyen, 
2014; Rugman et al., 2014; Rugman, Nguyen & Wei, 2016). Home country 
government support (a type of home CSAs) enables EMNEs to embark on 
internationalization and influences their strategic decisions (Duanmu, 2014; Hong et 
al., 2015; Wang et al., 2012). On the one hand, government support and assistance 
may alleviate EMNEs’ competitive disadvantages by providing favorable policies, 
investment information, and low-cost capital (Lu, Liu, & Wang, 2011; Luo et al., 
2010). On the other hand, such institutional incentives toward OFDI may affect 
EMNE subsidiary managers’ perceptions toward resource availability and their 
capabilities to take risks in foreign markets (Lu et al., 2014; Pan et al., 2014). 
Second, EMNEs’ foreign subsidiaries suffer from the liabilities of origin as a 
direct consequence of weak domestic institutions (Madhok & Keyhani, 2012; Wang 
et al., 2014). Institutional constraints in emerging economies include both institutional 
voids (i.e. an absence of intermediaries and regulatory systems which facilitate a well-
functioning market, such as a lack of effective intellectual property rights protection, 
poor law enforcement, and underdeveloped factor markets) (Boisot & Meyer, 2008; 
Khanna & Palepu, 2010) and political hazards (i.e. corruption, moral degradation, 
ambiguous laws, government intervention, and informal competition) (Ramachandran 
& Pant, 2010; Witt & Lewin, 2007).  
The liabilities of origin of EMNEs’ foreign subsidiaries in host countries refer 
to the negative institutional heritage associated with poor corporate governance, 
negative credibility, a lack of accountability and transparency of EMNEs perceived 
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by different stakeholders (Luo & Tung, 2007; Wang et al., 2014). The liabilities of 
origin are different from the liabilities of foreignness, which refers to geographical, 
psychological, and cultural distance between home and host countries (Madhok & 
Keyhani, 2012).  
Firms may overcome the liabilities of foreignness through global integration 
strategy, in which their subsidiaries rely on parent firms’ FSAs in order to compete 
with local competitors and other global giants in foreign markets (Rugman & 
Verbeke, 1992, 2001). Such a strategy best explains market-seeking OFDI in which 
foreign subsidiaries focus on exploiting parent firm’s existing FSA bundles to achieve 
economies of scale and scope (Ramamurti, 2012). In contrast, firms need to pursue a 
local responsiveness strategy in order to overcome the liabilities of origin, which are 
originated from weak domestic institutions which impede firm resource development 
at parent-level. Foreign subsidiaries develop and/or acquire new FSAs by accessing 
host CSAs, which may explain strategic asset-seeking OFDI.  It is important for 
EMNEs’ foreign subsidiaries to disassociate from their parent firms and to take 
initiatives in building local legitimacy in host economies (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999; 
Wang et al., 2014; Xu & Shenkar, 2002). 
EMNEs’ foreign investments driven by strategic asset-seeking have been 
widely recognized in the current literature. EMNEs use their subsidiaries as a 
“springboard” to develop linkage, leverage, and learning (LLL) of new capabilities in 
host countries, and to acquire strategic resources, especially through cross-border 
mergers and acquisitions (M&As) (Cui & Jiang, 2012; Luo & Tung, 2007; 
Ramamurti, 2012). Overall, the strategies of EMNEs’ foreign subsidiaries in response 
to home country institutions reflect the complex parent-subsidiary relationships. 
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3. Hypotheses development 
3.1. Home country government support and the global integration and local 
responsiveness strategy of the subsidiary 
One important precondition for global integration strategy is that an MNE 
needs to possess FSAs which can be exploited by their subsidiaries in foreign markets 
(Rugman, 2002; Rugman & Verbeke, 2003). However, EMNEs are different from 
Western MNEs because they derive their competitiveness from home CSAs rather 
than FSAs (Buckley, Clegg, Cross, & Voss, 2010; Deng, 2009; Rugman & Li, 2007; 
Rugman et al., 2016). Home country government support (a type of home CSAs) 
includes direct assistance in the form of preferential credit, low-interest bank loans 
and subsidies, host country information, guidance on direction of OFDI, 
administrative assistance, and post-investment supervision (Luo et al., 2010; Morck et 
al., 2008).  
First, home country government support downplays the role and importance of 
existing FSAs as stimulus for MNEs to engage in OFDI. It is one particularly 
important instrument for EMNEs in their internationalization through establishing 
foreign subsidiaries (Hong et al., 2015; Nayyar, 2008; Wang et al., 2012). While 
EMNEs lack knowledge-based FSAs, home country government support reduces 
foreign subsidiaries’ reliance on parent-firm FSAs in offsetting costs associated with 
the liabilities of foreignness and in competing with local firms (Buckley et al., 2010; 
Luo & Tung, 2007; Peng, 2012).  
Second, with the access to home country government support and low-cost 
capital, EMNEs can achieve strategic-asset seeking OFDI by purchasing available 
assets through M&As (Deng, 2009; Luo et al., 2010; Wei, 2010). Acquisitions of 
foreign brand and local technology enable EMNEs to overcome the liabilities of 
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origin so that they can compete with advanced economy MNEs (Madhok & Keyhani, 
2012). Purchases of local firms’ resources help EMNEs’ foreign subsidiaries to 
reduce reliance on the HQs’ FSAs and become less integrated with parent firms. In 
essence, EMNEs’ foreign subsidiaries use home country government support and 
assistance as an alternative solution to overcome their parent firms’ competitive 
disadvantages. Thus, we predict that:  
Hypothesis 1a: An EMNE’s foreign subsidiary, whose parent firm receives greater 
home country government support towards OFDI, will be characterized by lower 
global integration strategy. 
 
Foreign subsidiaries need to develop and/or to acquire new FSAs and adapt 
their operations to local environments to gain the benefits of local responsiveness 
(Bartlett & Ghosbal, 1989; Prahalad & Doz, 1987; Rugman & Verbeke, 1992, 2001). 
Moreover, local responsiveness strategy emphasizes the combination of new FSAs 
creation with host CSAs (Birkinshaw & Hood, 1998; Meyer et al., 2011; Nguyen & 
Rugman, 2015a, 2015b). However, such combination is very difficult to achieve, 
since host country resource endowments are monopolized by local firms and are not 
freely accessible (Hennart, 2009, 2012; Rugman et al., 2014). Previous studies show 
that EMNEs’ foreign subsidiaries generally fail to tap into host CSAs and to respond 
to local environments, due to their limited internationalization experience, weak 
strategic planning, and ineffective relationships with host country stakeholders (Fan et 
al., 2008; Fan & Zhu, 2014; Luo & Tung, 2007; Wang et al., 2014).  
Home country government support provides EMNEs (especially those firms 
from China) with extra resources, which may pave the way for them to take risks 
abroad (Buckley et al., 2010; Luo & Tung, 2007). This reduces subsidiary managers’ 
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perceptions on competitive disadvantages of their parent firms, and enables them to 
overcome uncertainties associated with local responsiveness strategy in foreign 
markets. In other words, home country government support may help subsidiary 
managers feel more confident in pursuing local responsiveness strategy and in 
adapting to local business requirements (Lu et al., 2014; Wang et al., 2012). 
Therefore, we predict that:  
Hypothesis 1b: An EMNE’s foreign subsidiary, whose parent firm receives greater 
home country government support towards OFDI, will be characterized by greater 
local responsiveness strategy. 
 
3.2. Moderating effects of state ownership on the relationship between home country 
government support and the global integration and local responsiveness strategy of 
the subsidiary  
We argue that the effects of home country government support on the global 
integration strategy of the subsidiary are contingent upon the degree of state 
ownership of the parent firm for two key reasons. First, state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs), especially in the case of Chinese SOEs, have privileged access to valuable 
government-controlled resources, such as cheap financing, low tax rates, and public 
R&D, which are not available to other types of companies (Deng, 2009; Hong et al., 
2015; Morck et al., 2008; OECD, 2008; Xu & Zhang, 2008). Since 2000, Chinese 
government has actively supported the globalization of SOEs as they are “national 
champions” (Liang et al., 2015). In contrast, it was not until 2003 that private 
enterprises in China were formally allowed to invest abroad with a very limited scale 
(Alon, 2010; Wei, 2010). Consequently, foreign subsidiaries of Chinese SOEs tend to 
perceive government support as a type of FSAs embedded in their parent firms, which 
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are closely related to the state-ownership nature and tightly intertwined with home 
country institutions (home CSAs).  
Second, Chinese SOEs are more likely to perceive government support as 
signal of political control and intervention, given that the government is the company 
owner (Duanmu, 2014; Shi, Markoczy, & Stan, 2014).  They are required to fulfill 
national objectives in their internationalization, such as securing energy supply and 
enhancing domestic firms’ innovation capabilities (Duanmu, 2014; Globerman & 
Shapiro, 2009; Wang et al., 2012). Thus, the global integration strategy assures that 
foreign subsidiaries’ activities are directed towards achieving the main objectives of 
the HQs (Chang & Taylor, 1999; Thite, Wilkinson, & Shah, 2012). In other words, 
foreign subsidiaries are deeply embedded in the internal networks, in which parent 
firms maintain high degree of control in foreign operations and implement centralized 
organizational structure (Harzing, 2000; Westney & Zaheer, 2009). Taken our 
theoretical arguments altogether, we predict that 
Hypothesis 2a: The negative effect of home country government support on the global 
integration strategy of an EMNE’s subsidiary is weakened with greater state 
ownership of the parent firm.  
 
The degree of state ownership moderates the effect of home country 
government support on the local responsiveness strategy of EMNEs’ subsidiaries. 
First, Chinese SOEs are often viewed as extremely inefficient and ineffective in 
converting home country government support into proprietary FSAs and in achieving 
superior financial performance results (Chen & Tan, 2013; Cornett, Guo, Khaksari, & 
Tehranian, 2010). Although they have greater access to government resources than 
firms without state ownership, Chinese SOEs’ return on assets (ROA) are about half 
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of their non-state counterparts and the debt-to-equity ratio is 1.6 compared to 0.8 for 
private firms (The Economist, 2014, 2015). The poor performance of SOEs is due to 
pressures to achieve political goals beyond economic rationalities, government 
intervention, and a lack of transparency in business practices (Buckley, 2014; Chen & 
Tan, 2013; Delios, Zhou, & Xu, 2008). Consequently, home country government 
support is less effective in helping foreign subsidiaries of SOEs to attain local 
adaptation and build local legitimacy in foreign markets.  
Second, state ownership increases the liabilities of origin of EMNEs’ foreign 
subsidiaries, because they are associated with a negative image of bureaucratic and 
inefficient operations relative to private and foreign enterprises (Meyer et al., 2014; 
OECD, 2009). State ownership may raise skepticism and hostility against EMENs’ 
foreign subsidiaries, which are viewed as agents to implement political and economic 
ambitions of their home country governments (Rugman et al., 2014). Accordingly, 
their foreign subsidiaries may encounter greater uncertainties in accessing 
complementary resources in host countries and in achieving local responsiveness 
strategy (Cui & Jiang, 2012; Morck et al., 2008; Rugman et al., 2014). Hence, the 
effect of home country government support in facilitating subsidiaries’ local 
responsiveness strategy is likely less significant for EMNEs with greater state 
ownership. Thus we predict that:  
Hypothesis 2b: The positive effect of home country government support on the local 
responsiveness strategy of an EMNE’s subsidiary is weakened with greater state 
ownership of the parent firm.  
 
3.3. Domestic institutional weaknesses and the global integration and local 
responsiveness strategy of the subsidiary 
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Competitive disadvantages of EMNEs originate from their domestic 
institutional weaknesses, which impede EMNEs to develop FSAs in their home 
countries (Khanna & Palepu, 2010; Luo & Wang, 2012). Formal institutional voids, 
such as weak intellectual property rights and ineffective legal frameworks, discourage 
firms to invest in R&D, develop technological capabilities, and build global brands 
(Luo & Tung, 2007; Nolan, 2005). Informal institutional hazards, such as corruption, 
moral degradation, government intervention, and local protectionism impede firms to 
develop managerial capabilities and improve corporate governance practices (Boisot 
& Meyer, 2008; Wang et al., 2014).  
Domestic institutional weaknesses push EMNEs to invest in more efficient 
and transparent institutional environments, where they can concentrate on generating 
new knowledge and developing their competitive advantages (Wei, 2010; Witt & 
Lewin 2007). In other words, EMNEs’ foreign subsidiaries may become less 
integrated with parent-level resources and the HQs’ organizational culture which is 
deeply rooted in home country institutional deficiencies. Therefore, we suggest that:  
Hypothesis 3a: An EMNE’s foreign subsidiary, which perceives greater domestic 
institutional weaknesses, will be characterized by lower global integration strategy. 
 
Because of domestic institutional weaknesses, EMNE parent firms are unable 
to build global reputation and develop advanced technology. In order to compensate 
for competitive disadvantages and survive in foreign markets, EMNEs’ foreign 
subsidiaries need to develop new strategic resources and build their own reputation 
and legitimacy in local operations (Luo & Tung, 2007; Wang et al., 2014).  
Domestic institutional weaknesses also have psychological consequences for 
EMNEs’ subsidiary managers in the form of either self-doubt or unawareness of the 
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firms’ true potential in international competition and shift their emphasis on foreign 
operations (Bartlett & Ghosbal, 2000). Foreign subsidiaries need to develop FSAs 
through local adaptation as they are impelled to increase credibility within EMNEs 
(Deng, 2009; Rui & Yip, 2008; Wang et al., 2014). Hiring managers from host 
countries enable EMNEs’ foreign subsidiaries to build local credibility and distance 
themselves from the unfavorable image of their parent firms (Bartlett & Ghosbal, 
2000; Wang et al., 2014). Therefore, we predict that:  
Hypothesis 3b: An EMNE’s foreign subsidiary, which perceives greater domestic 
institutional weaknesses, will be characterized by greater local responsiveness 
strategy. 
 
3.4. Moderating effects of state ownership on the relationship between domestic 
institutional weaknesses and the global integration and local responsiveness strategy 
of the subsidiary 
On the one hand, state ownership might compensate for the negative effects of 
domestic institutional weakness because SOEs can achieve market power based on 
the access to government resources and the benefits of preferential treatment (Boisot 
& Meyer, 2008; Luo et al., 2010; Meyer et al., 2014). For example, Chinese SOEs 
often have in-house research institutes and government-funded R&D investments 
because they are considered as major actors in the national innovation system (OECD, 
2008; Xu & Zhang, 2008). This may offset their foreign subsidiaries’ perceptions 
toward competitive disadvantages resulting from inefficient domestic R&D systems 
and weak intellectual property protection rights.  
On the other hand, domestic institutional hazards may not be a matter of 
concerns for state-owned EMNEs due to their inherent organizational culture and 
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corporate governance. For example, Chinese SOEs often sacrifice economic goals in 
favor of interests of the state. They are controlled by multiple levels of government 
authorities, which result in a lack of accountability and transparency. Thus, agency 
problems are particularly profound in Chinese SOEs (Chen & Young, 2010; 
Globerman & Shapiro, 2009; Liu & Tylecote, 2009). This is a type of administrative 
heritage of Chinese SOEs. Consequently, foreign subsidiaries of state-owned EMNEs 
do not perceive institutional hazards really a big problem. Thus, we hypothesize:  
Hypothesis 4a: The negative effect of domestic institutional weaknesses on the global 
integration strategy of an EMNE’s foreign subsidiary is weakened with greater state 
ownership of the parent firm.  
 
Domestic institutional weaknesses push foreign subsidiaries to access host 
CSAs in developing new resources through local responsiveness strategy. This will 
assure their survival and growth in the intensified competition with local firms and 
other global giants in foreign markets. In other words, local responsiveness strategy is 
assumed to be mainly driven by the economic considerations of performance and 
profit maximization.  
However, Chinese SOEs’ foreign subsidiaries often carry out the ultimate 
goals of home country government in achieving a broader scope of national-level 
objectives (Globerman & Shapiro, 2009; Pan et al., 2014). The political purposes of 
Chinese OFDI often outweigh the economic purposes (Buckley et al., 2007; Cuervo-
Cazurra, Inkpen, Musacchio, & Ramaswamy, 2014; Duanmu, 2014). Furthermore, 
Chinese SOEs are not under pressure of dividend payments to their majority 
shareholders–the state, and threats of bankruptcy for poor financial performance 
(Chen & Young, 2010; Globerman & Shapiro, 2009; Luo et al., 2010; Zhang & 
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Freestone, 2013). Therefore, they are less motivated to improve their competitive 
disadvantages and to catch up with global competitors.  
The above discussion suggests that SOEs and their foreign subsidiaries tend to 
downplay the importance of economic objectives in their internationalization and thus 
make less effort to compensate for domestic institutional weaknesses by taking 
initiatives and creating new FSAs through local responsiveness strategy. Thus, we 
predict that:  
Hypothesis 4b: The positive effect of domestic institutional weaknesses on the local 
responsiveness strategy of an EMNE’s foreign subsidiary is weakened with greater 
state ownership of the parent firm.  
 
The direct effects of home country government support and domestic 
institutional weaknesses, and the moderating effects of state ownership on global 
integration and local responsiveness of Chinese multinational subsidiaries are 
depicted in Figure 1.  
Insert Figure 1 here 
 
4. Methodology 
4.1. Research context, data sources, sample and questionnaire design  
We test our hypotheses using a self-constructed dataset of foreign subsidiaries 
of the top 500 Chinese manufacturing firms, published by the China Enterprise 
Confederation and China Enterprise Directors Association. We only focus on 
manufacturing Chinese firms since service OFDI still accounts for only a small 
fraction of China’s total OFDI (Wang et al., 2014). We compiled a list of Chinese 
multinational subsidiaries from multiple sources. These included firms’ annual reports, 
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announcements on the establishment of new subsidiaries, stock market documents 
(e.g., prospectuses, share issues, and various announcements), websites of Chinese 
firms and their foreign subsidiaries. We had a total population of 633 foreign 
subsidiaries, which belong to 144 Chinese manufacturing MNEs investing in 78 
countries from 1991 to 2010.  
We carefully designed our questionnaire survey which was based on 
international business (IB) theories. We self-designed questions of home country 
government support and domestic institutional weaknesses because these two 
variables are new in the literature of EMNEs and their subsidiaries. They were 
grounded in the home country institution-based view and prior research on Chinese 
OFDI (Deng, 2009; Luo & Tung, 2007; Luo et al., 2010; Morck et al., 2008; Wei, 
2010). Other questions were adapted from previous empirical studies on subsidiary 
strategies (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1989; Kim & Hwang, 1992; Luo, 2001). We had our 
survey instrument reviewed by several accomplished profound senior scholars in the 
field of IB, especially those conducting research on subsidiary strategy and 
management.  
We pre-tested our questionnaires by telephone interviews with eight 
subsidiaries, which belong to three Chinese MNEs located in Zhejiang province and 
they are included in our final sample. These subsidiary managers provided useful 
feedback and suggestions and we revised our questionnaire accordingly. These 
include (1) statements in each question should be shorter and simpler; (2) plain 
language should be used instead of academic terminologies; (3) questions for several 
variables which were adopted from the literature were revised to avoid confusion. 
These careful procedures assured that our questionnaire was easy to understand and to 
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respond. The specific questions used in this study are presented in Table 1 with 
detailed assessment of construct reliability and construct validity. 
Insert Table 1 here 
Our unit of analysis was Chinese multinational subsidiaries and the most 
desirable informants were subsidiary managers. According to our pre-test interviews, 
subsidiary managers who were closely involved in the process of establishment of 
foreign subsidiaries were familiar with home country institutions.  To ensure the 
reliability of our survey data, we targeted the following informants:  
1) the respondent was a member of the top management team (i.e. either a managing 
director or a general manager).  
2) the investment project was completed by 2010. 
3) the respondent has been involved in the establishment process of the subsidiary. 
We manually collected information on subsidiary management team and the 
contact information from multiple sources. These include information in annual 
reports, websites of parent firms and foreign subsidiaries, business news, professional 
networks such as LinkedIn, and other public sources. We approached subsidiary 
managers by e-mails to invite them to participate in the survey. We also sent our 
questionnaires to subsidiary managers by post when we could not find their email 
address information. We collected data over a period of seven months from 
September 2011 to March 2012.  We contacted all 633 subsidiaries. After two rounds 
of invitation and five rounds of friendly reminders, we received 124 complete and 
valid responses. Our survey achieved a response rate of 19.6 percent, comparable 
favourably to that of previous studies focusing on subsidiary managers (e.g., Harzing, 
2002: 20.0 percent; Luo, 1999: 19.2 percent; Nguyen & Rugman, 2015a, 2015b: 20 
percent). 
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The sample size is sufficient for our empirical tests for two reasons. First, 
according to Bartlett, Kotrlik, & Higgins (2001), a sample size of 124 respondents is 
enough for a total population of 633 foreign subsidiaries required for continuous data. 
Second, the ratio of observations to independent variables should not fall below five 
for multiple regression analysis in order to ensure the results are not too specific to the 
sample (Hair, Black, Babin, & Anderson, 2010). Therefore, the sample is statistically 
sufficient given that there are eleven variables (including control variables) in this 
study.   
Table 2 presents the data characteristics of our sample subsidiaries and their 
parent firms. The 124 participating subsidiaries belong to 118 Chinese parent firms. 
In terms of entry modes, 65 percent of sample subsidiaries are established by 
greenfields and 35 percent by acquisitions. In terms of ownership, 59 percent are 
wholly owned foreign subsidiaries (WFOEs) and 41 percent are joint ventures (JVs). 
Subsidiaries of state-owned parent firms account for 41 percent and of non-state 
owned parent firms for 59 percent. In terms of geographic dispersion, 62 percent of 
these subsidiaries are located in developed countries (25 percent in the United States, 
19 percent in Europe, 6 percent in Oceania and 12 percent in other regions), and 38 
percent of the sample subsidiaries are established in developing countries (27 percent 
in Asia, 8 percent in Africa and 3 percent in others).  
Insert Table 2 here 
 
4.2. Non-response bias test  
To estimate the likelihood of a non-response bias, we compared data 
characteristics of respondents and non-respondents, which we collected these data 
from parent firms’ annual reports. We used the chi-square test for categorical 
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variables and the t-test for continuous variables. The results show that there are no 
differences between the respondents and non-respondents at a 5 percent significance 
level, in terms of equity ownership (WFOE versus JV: x2=3.42, p=.18), establishment 
modes (greenfield versus acquisition: x2=0.14, p=.71), host country (developing 
versus developed: x2=0.02, p=.90), the degree of state ownership (t=0.88, p=.38), and 
investment size (t=-0.62, p=.54).  
Meanwhile, we used a time trend extrapolation test following Armstrong & 
Overton (1977) who argue that late respondents tend to represent non-respondents. 
We compare the above characteristics between early respondents and late 
respondents. The early respondents included all those who filled in the 
questionnaire promptly after they had received our e-mails from the first two rounds 
of invitations, whereas the late-respondent group consisted of those who responded 
following the last two rounds of reminders. There are no significant differences 
between early and late respondent groups with the above characteristics.  
Since the decision to response or not response our questionnaire was made by 
individual informants, so the final sample is a self-selected and not a random sample. 
Therefore, we applied the Heckman correction procedure (Heckman, 1979) with 
a two-step statistical approach to check if there is a selection bias. This approach has 
been used by other studies checking the non-response bias (Lepak, Takeuchi & Snell, 
2003; Pérez-Nordtvedt, Babakus & Kedia, 2010). Baruch & Holtom (2008) argue that 
individuals are more likely to respond to questionnaire if they are from a low power 
distance country and receive questionnaire through email (compared to traditional 
mail). We introduced these two new variables that influence whether an informant 
responded to our questionnaire in the Heckman selection equation, since all the other 
variables (equity ownership, establishment modes, state ownership, host country 
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development and investment size) are included in the initial model for integration and 
local responsiveness. We find that the value for the calculated inverse Mills ratio 
(IMR) is not statistically significant. We report and discuss the hypothesis results in 
Section 5 by including IMR as one control variable. We also compare the results for 
independent variables and moderating effects with the results generated without the 
inclusion of IMR, and the values remain the same. Therefore, we conclude that non-
response bias is not a serious problem in this study. 
 
4.3. Common method variance 
The best strategy to avoid potential common method variance is to collect 
information for dependent and independent variables from different sources (Chang, 
Witteloostuijn, & Eden 2010). In addition to the survey data, we constructed one 
independent variable (state ownership) and several control variables (subsidiary size, 
establishment mode, equity ownership, and host country development) by using 
information from parent firms’ annual reports and country-level public data source 
(World Bank country classification). The parent firms are publicly listed and are 
required to disclose information and data.  
In addition, we also implemented a number of ex-ante and ex-post procedures 
suggested by Chang et al., (2010) and Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff 
(2003). First, in the ex-ante procedures, we assured respondents of complete 
confidentiality. We used multi-item constructs, and scale items of interest were spread 
throughout the questionnaire. Furthermore, the survey asked a broad range of issues 
on Chinese OFDI, which went beyond this study’s focus. Dependent and independent 
variables appeared in different parts of the questionnaire, which created a 
psychological separation for the respondents (Podsakoff et al., 2003).  
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Second, in the ex-post procedures, we specified a complex model that includes 
moderating effects, since such complicated relationships are not a part of the 
respondents’ theory-in-use (Chang et al., 2010). Moreover, we applied the statistical 
remedy, which includes Harman’s one-factor test (Podsakoff & Organ, 1986). A 
principle component analysis showed that the largest factor explains only 18.4 percent 
of the total variance in the analysis. Thus, our results are not subject to a common 
method bias in the survey responses. 
 
4.4. Variable measurements 
4.4.1. Dependent variables 
The scale used for the dependent variables in the survey is provided in Table 1.  
Global integration emphasizes the support and resource sharing between parent 
MNEs and their foreign subsidiaries (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1989; Kobrin, 1991; Mauri 
& Phatak, 2001). We use the construct developed by Kim & Hwang (1992), in which 
a subsidiary’s global integration is measured by subsidiary managers’ perceptions 
toward sharing with Chinese parent firms’ resources in seven areas after foreign entry. 
We use a 7-point Likert scale (1=not at all to 7=very much).  
We follow Luo (2001), in which the construct of local responsiveness is 
measured as subsidiary managers’ perceptions towards responses to local customer 
needs, government policies, market conditions, and rivalries using a 7-point Likert 
scale (1=not at all to 7=very much).  
 
4.4.2. Independent variables  
Respondents evaluate home country government support during subsidiary 
establishment on a 7-point Likert scale (1=not at all to 7=very much), in terms of 
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financial support, the gathering of intelligence data and information, privileged access 
to domestic resources, and risk-safeguard mechanisms.  
Domestic institutional weaknesses is measured by subsidiary managers’ 
perceptions toward OFDI as the strategy to escape from China’s institutional 
deficiencies using a 7-point Likert scale (1=not at all to 7=very much). This includes 
imperfect capital markets, weak intellectual property rights and legal frameworks, and 
decentralization of economic and political administration.     
 We measured the nature of state ownership in Chinese parent firms by the 
percentage of equity ownership by the Chinese government and its agencies. This 
measurement has been widely used by previous studies (Cui & Jiang, 2012; Wang et 
al., 2012). Our data is sourced from parent firms’ annual reports. 
 
4.4.3. Control variables 
We control for subsidiary size, which is measured by the ratio of financial 
investment of the subsidiary to the parent firm’s total global assets (Brouthers & 
Brouthers, 2000; Slangen & Hennart, 2008). Data is sourced from parent firms’ 
annual reports. 
Subsidiary’s establishment mode is a dummy variable with acquisitions coded 
as “1” and greenfields coded as “0”. Data is sourced from parent firms’ annual 
reports. A newly established subsidiary is more likely to adopt the strategy of global 
integration, while an acquired subsidiary is inclined to take a locally responsiveness 
strategy (Harzing, 2000, 2002; Slangen & Hennart, 2007).  
Equity ownership is measured by using the dummy variable “1” for WFOSs 
with more than 95% equity controlled by Chinese parent firms, and “0” for JVs. Data 
is sourced from parent firms’ annual reports. 
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Competition leads to a high level of local responsiveness by requiring 
subsidiaries to focus on product differentiation specific to local environment, and 
maintain good relationships with local stakeholders (Luo, 2001). Respondents self-
assess local competition in host markets with respect to existing rivals and new 
entrants based on a 7-point Likert scale (1=not at all to 7=very much).  
Demand heterogeneity makes it more difficult and less efficient to globally 
leverage resources and manage dispersed international operations (Doz & Prahalad, 
1991). In contrast, differences in demands across host countries require a high degree 
of product differentiation and local adaption (Luo, 2001; Roth & Morrison, 1990). 
Demand heterogeneity is measured by a pair of questions concerning diversity and 
segmentation with a 7-point Likert scale (1=not at all to 7=very much) (Luo, 2001). 
We controlled for host country economic development by following 
classification of the World Bank. We use a dummy variable with developed country 
coded as “1” and developing country coded as “0”. Finally, we control for the 
potential effect of different manufacturing sectors on subsidiary strategy by using 
primary metal as the baseline industry.  
 
4.5. Reliability and validity of construct assessment   
We assess the reliability of six multi-item constructs with Cronbach’s alpha. A 
value of 0.70 is the cut-off point of a satisfactory internal consistency (Field, 2009; 
Hair et al., 2010). As shown in Table 1, Cronbach’s alpha ranges from 0.767 to 0.856, 
indicating that the scale items of our constructs are reliable.  
We evaluate construct validity by examining convergent and discriminant 
validity. The confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) model provides a good overall fit of 
the data (Chi-square=346.458; CMIN/DF=2.203; NFI=0.930; CFI=0.974; 
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RMSEA=0.072). As shown in Table 1, all individual items load strongly, which are 
much greater than the recommended value of 0.50 and they are statistically significant 
(Fornell & Larcker, 1981; Hair et al., 2010). This indicates that they converge on a 
common underlying construct.  
We also assess six constructs for discriminant validity by calculating the 
square root of the average variance extracted (AVE) (see Table 1). The value of the 
square root of AVE estimates for each construct is significantly greater than any 
correlation among pairs of constructs. Therefore, the constructs demonstrate adequate 
discriminant validity (Fornell & Larcker, 1981).  
 
5. Results  
5.1. Hypotheses tests and results  
Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics of all variables and their correlations.  
Insert Table 3 here 
All correlations between pairs of independent variables are lower than 0.3, 
which is below the threshold of 0.5 (Hair et al., 2010). The analysis for Variance 
Inflation Factor (VIF) and Tolerance shows that the largest VIF value is 1.942 and the 
lowest Tolerance Value is 0.705. Hence, there is no sign of multicollinearity in our 
dataset. Furthermore, we make all interaction terms to be mean-centred to avoid 
potential multicollinearity problems (Cui & Jiang, 2012; Wang et al., 2012).  
We test our hypotheses using ordinary least square (OLS) estimates (by 
having the IMR as one control variable). We use two separate sets of models (each 
including control variables, independent variables, and the moderator) to test 
hypotheses for global integration and local responsiveness, as reported in Table 4 and 
Table 5 respectively. We analyze four models for each dependent variable and the F-
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statistics indicates that all of them are significant.  
As shown in Table 4, Model 1 includes control variables and state ownership. 
Three of the control variables (establishment mode, equity ownership and demand 
heterogeneity) are significant. State ownership of Chinese parent firms is positively 
and significantly associated with subsidiaries’ global integration strategy (p<0.05). 
Insert Table 4 here 
Model 2 includes two independent variables. The result (p<0.01) supports 
Hypothesis 1a, which indicates that Chinese multinational subsidiaries perceive home 
country government support as a source of compensation for their lack of traditional 
Western-type FSAs, so that they can overcome the liabilities of foreignness by 
integrating less with their parent firms. The results illustrate that Hypothesis 3a is 
supported (p<0.05) indicating the greater the domestic institutional imperfections 
perceived by subsidiary managers, the weaker the global integration strategy will be.  
In Model 3, Hypothesis 2a is not supported since the moderating effect of state 
ownership on the relationship between government support and global integration is 
insignificant. The results support Hypothesis 4a (p<0.05), which suggests that 
subsidiaries of Chinese MNEs with greater degree of state ownership are not willing 
to overcome domestic institutional deficiencies by disintegrating from their parent 
firms. However, the global integration strategy in the case of Chinese SOEs is purely 
driven by political orientations, especially in accessing government resources and 
maintaining consistency with political objectives (Deng, 2009; Luo & Tung, 2007; 
Wang et al., 2012). These types of advantages associated with state ownership are 
deeply rooted in China’s institutions, which are difficult to be transferred 
internationally (Rugman et al., 2016). Finally, the results are robust in Model 4 (full 
model), which includes all independent variables and moderating effects. The 
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adjusted R2 value (0.344) for the full model is higher than the other models.  
Table 5 provides the regression results for local responsiveness strategy. Three 
control variables in the baseline Model 1 are significant (establishment mode, demand 
heterogeneity, and host country economic development). Meanwhile, subsidiaries of 
Chinese MNEs with higher state ownership are not actively responsive to local 
conditions (p<0.01). In Model 2, no significant relationship is observed between 
government support and subsidiary strategy of local responsiveness. Therefore, 
Hypothesis 1b is not supported. In contrast, domestic institutional weaknesses push 
foreign subsidiaries to pursue local responsiveness strategy (p<0.001). Therefore 
Hypothesis 3b is supported.  
Insert Table 5 here 
In Model 3 with moderating effects, Hypothesis 2b is not supported, as the 
coefficient estimate is insignificant. In contrast, Hypothesis 4b is supported as state 
ownership negatively moderates the impact of domestic institutional weaknesses on 
the subsidiary strategy of local responsiveness (p<0.05). This is undesirable because 
Chinese SOEs face even greater liabilities of origin due to their bureaucratic nature, 
weak corporate governance and poor operating efficiency (Chen & Young, 2010; 
Globerman & Shapiro, 2009). However, their foreign subsidiaries are not motivated 
to pursue local responsiveness strategy as responses to domestic institutional 
deficiencies due to rigidity coming from the direct consequence of state ownership 
nature. Additionally, Model 4 which includes all variables shows unchanged results 
and improves explanatory power.  
Figure 2 illustrates the moderating effects of state ownership. 
Insert Figure 2 here 
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5.2. Robustness tests 
We perform robustness tests and validate our results with resampling 
techniques, which are powerful tools for estimating standard errors in small samples. 
These include bootstrap standard errors and statistical tests from the average of the 
statistics from the bootstrap samples. We also split the dataset into two random 
sample groups and compare the results, which are consistent (Efron, 1983).  
To address endogeneity concerns, we conduct a Hausman test by comparing 
the OLS estimates with two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimates. We use region-
specific marketization developed by Fan, Wang, & Zhu (2006) as the instrumental 
variable (IV) for domestic institutional weaknesses, since uncertainties and 
transaction cost associated with weak institution and government interruption tend to 
be lower in regions with a higher level of marketization (Luk, Yau, Sin, Tse, Chow, 
& Lee, 2008). We identify the encouraged OFDI industries (Hong et al., 2015) and 
government financial grant toward Chinese parents as appropriate IVs for government 
support in OFDI. A valid IV should be correlated with the independent variables, but 
uncorrelated with the error term (Cameron & Trivedi, 2005). We conduct the over-
identifying restrictions test and perform a regression of the IV residuals. The results 
of 2SLS estimation are consistent with those of OLS analysis, showing that 
endogeneity is not a concern in the key variables. Due to space constraints, our 2SLS 
results are not reported.  
 
6. Discussion and conclusion  
6.1. Theoretical contributions  
This study enhances our understanding of the I/R framework in the context of 
EMNEs’ foreign subsidiaries. Bartlett & Ghoshal (1989) use case studies of nine 
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MNEs from advanced economies (the United States, Europe, and Japan) to develop 
the transnational solution, in which an MNE maintains high integration and resource 
coordination within MNE network, and requires subsidiaries simultaneously to 
actively response to local business environments and customer preferences. 
Transnational solution is perceived as the highest strategic solution since it is built 
upon multiple sources of competitive advantages, including parent-firm FSAs 
developed in home countries and subsidiary-generated FSAs through accessing host 
CSAs (Rugman & Verbeke, 1992, 2001, 2003; Rugman et al., 2011; Rugman & 
Nguyen, 2014).  
However, we find that home country institutions of EMNEs do not stimulate 
foreign subsidiaries to achieve twin goals of global integration and local 
responsiveness simultaneously. This may raise concerns about EMNEs’ 
internationalization strategies. First, subsidiaries tend to disintegrate with their parent 
firms due to domestic institutional deficiencies and a lack of FSAs developed by 
EMNEs in home countries. In other words, subsidiary strategy of global integration is 
constrained by their home country institutions. It is important for emerging economies 
to improve domestic institutional environments, so that EMNEs are more confident to 
rely on home CSAs to develop core FSAs.  
Second, EMNEs’ foreign subsidiaries tend to adopt a multinational strategy 
(also known as multi-domestic strategy) with low global integration (Hypothesis 3a) 
and high local responsiveness (Hypothesis 3b) as a response to weak domestic 
institutions. In other words, the success of EMNEs’ foreign operations largely depend 
upon their subsidiaries taking initiatives to develop competitive advantages by 
accessing host CSAs and responding to local market requirements. However, given 
that host country resources are monopolized by local firms and are not freely 
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accessible to foreign investors, local responsiveness is often difficult to achieve 
(Hennart, 2009, 2012).  
It is prevalent for EMNEs to purchase global brands and advanced technology 
in order to overcome the liabilities of origin, enhance their reputation, and achieve 
local adaptation. However, the major challenge for EMNEs is that with a short period 
of internationalization, they lack integration skills and systems, and international 
managerial expertise to integrate newly acquired assets and to coordinate worldwide 
activities (Peng, 2012; Rugman et al, 2016). One the one hand, government needs to 
devise support which helps EMNEs’ foreign subsidiaries to overcome uncertainties 
and risks associated with local responsiveness. On the other hand, given the 
insignificant relationship between government support and local responsiveness in 
this study, subsidiaries may need to take more initiatives in exploiting government 
support (a type of home CSAs) in realizing local adaption in host countries.  
 
6.2. Implications for practice 
Our study provides important implications for EMNE managers and policy 
makers. It is critical to recognize the importance of subsidiary strategies for EMNEs 
in overcoming their parent firms’ competitive disadvantages in international markets, 
and in contributing to the overall EMNEs’ long-term strategies to improve 
international competitiveness. Understanding the nature and the implications of home 
country institutional heritage for subsidiary strategies could prepare EMNEs’ 
subsidiary managers better for decisions on strategy and management of foreign 
businesses. The insights from our findings provide useful implications for policy 
makers, in which weak domestic institutions push EMNEs to depart from their parent 
firms by investing abroad. Meanwhile, government support and state ownership might 
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enable EMNEs to embark on internationalization but such institutional incentives 
might not be of help for their subsidiaries’ strategies in foreign markets.  
6.3. Limitations and suggestions for future research directions 
Our study is subject to several limitations. First, we use a survey dataset with 
Chinese multinational subsidiaries, which may raise concern on the country-specific 
nature of our findings. We suggest that future research could conduct a multiple-
country survey and compare and contrast the findings with our results. Second, 
subsidiary strategies are not static, but dynamic and evolving over time. However, our 
study is limited to the analysis from a cross-sectional data. It would be interesting to 
observe how foreign subsidiaries and parent firm EMNEs promote transnational 
solution over time. Lastly, the findings of our study are restricted to a set of the 
largest manufacturing MNEs. Future research can extend our work to other industries 
such as the service sector given that manufacturing OFDI often differs from services 
OFDI in terms of motives and local adaptation strategy (Brouthers & Brouthers, 
2003). 
 
7. Conclusions  
Our study advances the EMNE literature, moving away from the parent-
centric perspectives on internationalization. We confirm the importance of home 
country institutions in shaping subsidiary strategies of EMNEs. We find that it is 
difficult for EMNEs to pursue a transnational solution due to their lack of FSAs and 
the liabilities of origin they suffer because of their national origins from emerging 
economies. Domestic institutional weaknesses force EMNEs’ foreign subsidiaries to 
follow a multi-domestic strategy.  However, the nature of state ownership of parent 
firms make their foreign subsidiaries unwilling to disintegrate and unmotivated to 
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take initiatives in developing new FSAs and in responding to local conditions in 
foreign markets accordingly. In conclusion, our study is among the first few attempts 
to look into an important research area. We hope that it will prompt future research 
towards a more systematic understanding of EMNEs’ subsidiary strategies.  
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Figure 1: Conceptual model  
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Figure 2: Moderating effects of state ownership: interaction effects of state ownership 
and domestic institutional weaknesses on (a) global integration and (b) local 
responsiveness 
(a) 
 
 
(b)  
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Table 1: Reliability and validity assessment  
Construct  Measurement on 7-point Likert scale  Factor  
loading  
Global integration  
(Cronbach’s 
alpha=0.811;  
AVE= 0.699) 
After foreign entry, to what extent your subsidiary shared parent 
firms’ resources with respect to:  
 
1. raw material and intermediate products   0.71 
2. manufacturing know-how 0.74 
3. R&D resources 0.82 
4. the use of brand names 0.75 
5. marketing know-how 0.73 
6. sales channels 0.81 
7. management expertise 0.84 
Local responsiveness  
(Cronbach’s 
alpha=0.856; 
AVE=0.812) 
After foreign entry, the subsidiary responded actively to local 
environment, and adopted different products and customer service 
et al. for each of the following factor 
 
1. local customer needs 0.85 
2. local government policies 0.89 
3. local market conditions 0.75 
4. local rivalry situation 0.81 
Home country 
government support 
(Cronbach’s 
alpha=0.804; 
AVE=0.586) 
At the time of entry, to what extent your subsidiary had Chinese 
government support when considering the following factors? 
 
1. financial support during investment 0.83 
2. information about investment opportunities, market analysis and 
host country environment  
0.79 
3. privileged access to domestic education markets and sources of 
scientific and technical research 
0.73 
4. government signed mutual investment agreements with host 
countries 
0.69 
5. government provides personal accident insurance  to expatriates 
working abroad 
0.70 
Domestic institutional 
weaknesses 
(Cronbach’s 
alpha=0.790; 
AVE=0.674) 
At the time of entry, to what extent was the decision to 
establish/acquire the subsidiary influenced by the following 
institutional factors in China? 
 
1. domestic imperfect capital market 0.71 
2. weak intellectual property rights and legal frameworks 0.80 
3. decentralization of the economic system and government 
administration 
0.75 
Competition 
(Cronbach’s 
alpha=0.834; 
AVE=0.642) 
1. At the time of entry, to what extent did you think the product 
market in which your company participates is competitive amongst 
existing rivals? 
0.76 
2. At the time of entry, to what extent did you think the product 
market in which your company participates was competitive 
amongst new entrants? 
0.72 
Demand heterogeneity 
(Cronbach’s 
alpha=0.767; 
AVE=0.592) 
 
1. At the time of entry, to what extent did you think the demand 
for your products within a host market is segmented according to 
region, income, gender, education, or other demographic attributes? 
0.78 
2. Following the above question, to what extent did you think the 
demand for your products within each segmented market is 
diverse? 
0.76 
Note: AVE: Average Variance Extracted 
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Table 2: Respondents’ characteristics 
 
 
 
 
Subsidiary (N=124; data in percentage)  
A. Entry strategy  B. Ownership 
Greenfield  64.52 Wholly-owned  58.87 
Acquisition  35.48 Joint venture  41.13 
 
C. State ownership  D. Investment size  
State owned  41.13 100 and above 7.1 
Non-state owned  58.87 50 ~ 100 9.0 
  1 ~ 10  42.6 
  1 and below 41.3 
 
E. Host countries:   
Developed countries 62.10 Developing countries 37.90 
(including):   (including):   
The United States  25.00 Asia  26.61 
Europe  18.55 Africa  8.06 
Oceania 6.45 Other  3.23 
Others  12.10   
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics and correlation (N=124) 
Variables   
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
Mean 4.30 3.63 4.74 3.87 0.34 0.03 0.35 0.59 4.19 4.06 0.62 
S.D. 1.45 1.17 2.09 1.66 0.29 0.08 0.19 0.48 1.39 1.33 3.22 
1. Global integration  1           
2. Local responsiveness  -0.049 1          
3. Home country government support  -0.324 0.255 1         
4. Domestic institutional weaknesses -0.193 0.298 -0.091 1        
5. State ownership  0.053 -0.031 0.179 -0.219 1       
6. Subsidiary size  0.102 0.293 0.099 -0.133 0.148 1      
7. Establishment mode  -0.077 0.099 -0.064 0.103 0.063 0.129 1     
8. Equity ownership  0.055 -0.105 -0.031 -0.032 -0.036 0.012 -0.188 1    
9. Competition  0.109 0.036 0.025 0.003 -0.026 -0.176 -0.039 -0.049 1   
10. Demand heterogeneity  -0.214 0.152 0.042 0.026 -0.089 -0.061 -0.148 -0.070 0.133 1  
11. Host country economic development  -0.107 -0.218 0.015 0.187 -0.040 0.102 0.011 -0.125 0.050 0.061 1 
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Table 4: OLS regression results with the global integration as dependent variable 
Note: ***p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, ' p < 0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variables  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
(Constant) 2.653*** 
(0.562) 
3.167*** 
(0.668) 
2.702*** 
(0.565) 
3.340*** 
(0.676) 
Inverse mills ratio (IMR) 
 
0.036 
(0.003) 
0.040 
(0.003) 
0.040 
(0.003) 
0.042 
(0.003) 
Subsidiary size  1.657 
(1.434) 
1.565 
(1.447) 
1.565 
(1.438) 
1.443 
(1.445) 
Establishment mode  
 
-0.562' 
(0.294) 
-0.559' 
(0.074) 
-0.570' 
(0.055) 
-0.576' 
(0.0650 
Equity ownership 
 
1.127*** 
(0.271) 
1.111*** 
(0.275) 
1.109*** 
(0.272) 
1.081*** 
(0.275) 
Competition  0.065 
(0.080) 
0.062 
(0.080) 
0.056 
(0.080) 
0.051 
(0.080) 
Demand heterogeneity  -0.193* 
(0.084) 
-0.200* 
(0.084) 
-0.189* 
(0.084) 
-0.196* 
(0.084) 
Host country economic 
development  
-0.388 
(0.286) 
-0.337 
(0.290) 
-0.371 
(0.288) 
-0.307 
(0.292) 
State ownership 0.107* 0.108* 0.107* 0.109* 
 (0.074) (0.074) (0.074) (0.073) 
H1a Home country government support -0.244** 
(0.131) 
 -0.288** 
(0.101) 
H3a Domestic institutional weaknesses -0.157*  -0.133* 
  (0.050)  (0.054) 
H2a Home country government support x state ownership  0.024 
(0.011) 
0.022 
(0.011) 
H4a Domestic institutional weaknesses x state ownership 0.173* 
(0.028) 
0.144* 
(0.035) 
     
N 124 124 124 124 
F-value  7.009*** 7.680*** 6.623*** 6.906*** 
R2 0.280 0.352 0.297 0.397 
Adjusted R2 0.240 0.301 0.261 0.344 
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Table 5: OLS regression results with the local responsiveness as dependent variable 
Variables  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
(Constant) 4.242*** 
(0.455) 
4.307*** 
(0.543) 
4.268*** 
(0.460) 
4.340*** 
(0.555) 
Inverse mills ratio (IMR) 
 
0.020 
(0.002) 
0.023 
(0.002) 
0.022 
(0.002) 
0.024 
(0.002) 
Subsidiary size  0.596 
(1.163) 
0.766 
(1.176) 
0.621 
(1.171) 
0.780 
(1.186) 
Establishment mode  0.104* 
(0.238) 
0.096* 
(0.252) 
0.106* 
(0.240) 
0.092* 
(0.254) 
Equity ownership  -0.388 
(0.220) 
-0.346 
(0.224) 
-0.392 
(0.221) 
-0.353 
(0.226) 
Competition  0.020 
(0.065) 
0.018 
(0.065) 
0.022 
(0.066) 
0.020 
(0.066) 
Demand heterogeneity  0.175* 
(0.068) 
0.180** 
(0.068) 
0.172* 
(0.068) 
0.170* 
(0.069) 
Host country economic 
development 
-0.362** 
(0.232) 
-0.398** 
(0.236) 
-0.381** 
(0.235) 
-0.413** 
(0.239) 
State ownership -0.203** 
(0.068) 
-0.194** 
(0.058) 
-0.223** 
(0.070) 
-0.186** 
(0.050) 
     
H1b Home country government support  
 
0.171 
(0.066) 
 0.158 
(0.053) 
H3b Domestic institutional weaknesses 0.323*** 
(0.088) 
 0.319*** 
(0.083) 
    
H2b Home country government support x state ownership 
 
-0.041 
(0.034) 
-0.045 
(0.030) 
H4b Domestic institutional weaknesses x state ownership 
 
-0.063* 
(0.028) 
-0.080* 
(0.045) 
     
N 124 124 124 124 
F-value  4.643 6.282 4.152 5.289 
R2 0.200 0.237 0.217 0.279 
Adjusted R2 0.159 0.175 0.167 0.214 
Note: ***p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, ' p < 0.1 
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